to 2013. We find evidence that non-recourse states experience faster price growth during the boom period (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006), a sharper price drop during the bust period (2006-2009) and faster price recovery in the rebound period after a crisis (2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013). Moreover, the volatility of housing prices is higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states, particularly during the rebound period.
Introduction
A non-recourse mortgage is a type of loan that is secured by collateral (the house) but in which the borrower who defaults is not personally liable for the outstanding amount of the loan if the sale price of the house is below the value of the remaining loan. As noted by Pavlov and Wachter (2009) , a non-recourse mortgage provides the borrower with a put option: the borrower is entitled to capture all capital gains from the appreciation of the property but has no obligation for losses due to price drops because he can simply use the put option to sell the asset to the bank and walk away.
Are non-recourse mortgages "good" or "bad" for the housing market? One intuitive argument is that because borrowers have limited liability with non-recourse loans, they have a greater incentive to make speculative purchases, particularly during a market boom, which can create or magnify price "bubbles." Indeed, one of the main results of Pavlov and Wachter (2009) is that the embedded put option in a non-recourse loan is typically underpriced in equilibrium, indicating that the loan is cheaper for the borrower than it should be. Thus, borrowers' rational reaction is to borrow more, causing housing prices to remain above their fundamental values.
Similarly, when the market experiences a downturn, buyers with non-recourse mortgages face lower losses because they can put their houses and walk away, leading to excess supply in the secondary housing market and a further decrease in housing prices. Thus, non-recourse loans may also magnify the price plunge when a bubble bursts.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to defend non-recourse mortgages. For example, suppose that the housing market experiences a large price crash. If all the mortgages are recourse mortgages, borrowers will be forced to spend years paying back their remaining debts before they can purchase another house, which can be extremely harmful to price recovery. If the loans are non-recourse loans, borrowers have no further obligation to the banks after using their put option on their house. Demand will pick up when buyers' income is restored, and the market does not have to endure a prolonged recession.
This study examines the potential benefits and costs of non-recourse mortgages by using housing price data from US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The reason for not performing an international comparison is simple: the US is the only country in the world where non-recourse loans are implemented. Although a boom-bust pattern is indeed apparent in US housing prices during the 2000s, this cycle is also observable in some other countries, such as the UK and Spain, whereas the housing market remains very stable in countries such as Germany. Drawing any conclusions regarding the role of non-recourse mortgages via a comparative study of the US and other countries would be difficult. recourse states during the boom, bust, and rebound phases. The patterns regarding the total percentage change in the HPI lend support to our divisions among the boom, bust, and rebound phases: the HPI is non-negative for all MSAs during the boom phase (the appreciation is between 0% and 200%) and mostly non-positive for all MSAs during the bust phase (the depreciation is between 0% and 60%), and mostly positive for most MSAs (0% to 40%) during the rebound phase. Figure 1 also shows that when the change in income during the same period is controlled for, the total price growth is indeed higher in most of the non-recourse MSAs than in their recourse peers. The price plunge is more severe in non-recourse MSAs than in recourse MSAs. The difference between non-recourse and recourse MSAs is less pronounced during the rebound phase, although the non-recourse MSAs seem to have a slightly higher average total price appreciation.
Controlling for other economic variables in the fundamentals of housing prices, we find that non-recourse states experience faster price appreciation/depreciation/recovery than recourse states during the boom/bust/rebound period. The volatility (standard error) of housing prices is higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states, particularly during the recovery period.
Our results suggest that while non-recourse mortgages act as a destabilizing factor that renders the housing market more volatile, it also makes the market more resilient by aiding price recovery.
Our study fits into the broad literature on housing bubbles in the US, e.g., Case and Shiller Our results may be useful to legislators and policy makers in designing legislation and regulatory policies for the mortgage market from the perspective of enhancing the stability of housing prices. According to a report on the Bloomberg website (Smyth, 2011) quoted by Meir and Harris (2012) , a recent heated debate in Spanish parliament due to aggressive lobbying by mortgage debtors focused on the implementation of some form of non-recourse law. Although the bill was rejected, the issue remains on the table. Based on the results of this study, it may be better for Spain and the European countries faced with similar situation to move towards non-recourse mortgage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the data, section 3 conducts the econometric analysis, and section 4 concludes.
Data Description

Housing Price Index (HPI)
This paper mainly uses the quarterly HPI published by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. The HPI is a seasonally adjusted, purchase-only index for 100 largest MSAs. The HPI also provides all-transaction non-seasonal adjusted data covering 401 MSAs.
We do not use all-transactional data because such data also contain appraisal data for commercial properties, which is less relevant to the discussion on mortgages.
The time scope of this study is 2000-2013. Beginning in 2007, the US economy was greatly shocked by a subprime mortgage crisis and underwent a recession that lasted for the next five years. This crisis was rooted in the mortgage market and thus greatly affected housing prices.
Housing prices showed a growth-plunge-rebound pattern in the national US housing market.
To represent this pattern, we divide this period into three phases and create three dummy 
Recourse vs. Non-Recourse
We adopt the classification in Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) : in some US states, "recourse in residential mortgages is limited to the value of the collateral securing the loan," while in the other states, the lender "may be able to collect on debt not covered by the proceedings from a foreclosure sale." States in the former group are considered non-recourse states, while states in the latter group are considered recourse states.
A dummy variable for recourse mortgages is used to denote whether an MSA/state is a recourse or non-recourse MSA/state (taking the value of 1 for a recourse MSA/state and 0 otherwise). According to Ghent and Kudlyak's (2011) 
Control variables
Control variables from both the supply and demand side are used, and the list of variables is shown in Table 1 . Among these variables, the national interest rate, construction cost index, and local housing supply elasticity are exogenous variables. Local macroeconomic variables (population, income, and unemployment) can be influenced by the housing market. To address the issue of two-way causality, different specifications with lagged macroeconomic variables are used as robustness checks. The Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test (Im et al. 1999 ) is conducted for all the variables that can change over time, and the null hypothesis of unit root non-stationarity is always rejected at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
First, the selection of the controlling variables for local macroeconomic conditions is mainly based on the study by Jud and Winkler (2002) . These authors find strong evidence that real housing price appreciation is strongly influenced by population growth and real changes in income, construction costs, and interest rates. Moreover, Reichert (1990) argues that income and employment rates are important factors that explain differences among housing prices in different regions. Intuitively, population growth reflects changes in the demand side of the real estate market, while the unemployment rate influences average default choice, which affects the mortgage market and thus the real estate market. In addition to the two papers Finally, two variables are controlled for on the supply side: construction costs and the supply elasticity of local markets. We use the structure cost for single-family housing unit in 46 large
MSAs provided by the Lincoln Institute. Higher construction costs should be associated with higher housing prices. Boom-bust cycles can reasonably be assumed to be less likely to occur in a local housing market with higher supply elasticity. We use two indices as a measure of supply elasticity: (1) the index of supply elasticity based on the geographical characteristics of the region as defined by Saiz (2010) and (2) Regarding the expected signs of the coefficients, (1) higher supply elasticity according to Saiz (2010) should be correlated with lower price growth, and (2) stricter regulation according to Gyourko et al. (2008) implies a more rigid housing supply and thus should be correlated with higher price growth. The missing observations in construction cost data and Saiz supply elasticity leaves 45 effective observations when the variables on the supply side are controlled jointly.
The summary statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2 . The baseline period for the HPI is 1990 ( 1990 = 100). The average HPI growth is lower in the boom period because this period covers a greater number of years and because the HPI started at a relatively low level. The average income per capita is approximately 38000 USD per year. The average population maintains a mild growth rate. The average unemployment rate is approximately 6%, and it is higher in the bust and rebound phases than in the boom phase.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Data Analysis
Non-Parametric test
To quickly identify the difference between recourse and non-recourse MSAs/states, Table 3 shows the comparison for the median price change between the recourse and the non-recourse states during the growth, crash, and bounce periods. To avoid the problem of unbalanced sample sizes, the Mann-Whitney rank sum test, which compares only the median behavior of the two groups, is used. In the growth and crash periods, the ranks of recourse MSAs are significantly lower at the 5% level, indicating that the percentage change in the HPI is smaller in recourse states and in non-recourse states. This difference is not significant in the recovery period. This result provides support for the primary argument that the bubble-crash pattern is more salient in non-recourse states than in recourse states.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The Estimation
We conduct a panel data regression analysis on the HPI data with the following specification:
We use ℎ , = 100 ( ) that measures the percentage change in the HPI for each MSA in each quarter. When the interaction terms of the dummy variables for (non-)recourse
MSAs and phases for the housing price boom, bust, and rebound are included, 1 captures the difference in average growth rates of the HPI during the baseline (rebound) phase. During the boom and bust periods, the difference in the growth rates between non-recourse and recourse states is measured by 1 + 4 and 1 + 5 , respectively. 2 and 3 are indicator variables that capture the difference in the growth rate of the HPI between the boom and the rebound periods and between the bust and the rebound periods, respectively. Intuitively, the growth rate is higher during the boom period and lower during the bust period, and the expected signs are therefore 2 > 0, 3 < 0.
The regression applies a random effect model because if fixed effects for MSAs are introduced, the effect of (non-)recourse mortgages will be absorbed by the fixed effects for the MSAs. To ensure that the assumption under the random effect model is satisfied, we perform a Hausman test after we run the regressions. We find that the null hypothesis that the random effect model is preferred cannot be rejected even at the 10% level.
The key research question concerns how the recourse rule influences regional housing prices.
The expected signs of the coefficients are as follows: The result of the estimation of equation (1) is presented in Table 4 . The dependent variable is 100 ( ) so that the marginal effect of the coefficients can be easily interpreted based on percentage points. Robust standard errors are used to produce appropriate test statistics to protect against heteroskedasticity. Because some time may be required before the changes in income, population, and interest rates are incorporated into housing prices, we use lagged terms (L4 for 4 periods, meaning lagged by one year) of these variables for robustness checks in the specifications in columns (6)- (7).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The estimated coefficients are generally robust against different specifications. For the recourse dummies, we find that the HPI growth/drop/recovery rate is significantly higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states during the boom/bust/rebound period (the t-test for 1 = 0 against 1 < 0 is rejected at 5% level except for model (5), the F-test for 1 + 5 = 0 against 1 + 5 < 0 is rejected at 5% level except for model (5) , and the F-test for 1 + 4 = 0 against 1 + 4 > 0 is always rejected at the 5% level). In the most elaborate model (model (7)), the HPI growth rate is approximately 0.48% per quarter (1.9.% per year) higher during the boom, 1.6% per quarter (6.4% per year) lower during the bust (namely, the drop rate is 1.6% higher quarterly), and 0.54% per quarter (2.2% per year)
higher during the recovery phase in non-recourse states than in recourse states.
For the phase dummies (boom and bust), the HPI growth rate is estimated to be 1.5%-3%
higher per quarter during the boom phase and 2-4% lower per quarter during the bust phase, compared to the baseline phase (rebound phase).
The signs of the control variables are mostly consistent with our expectations. Income growth has positive sign and is usually significant at 5% level. Population growth has positive sign but is insignificant. The coefficient for the unemployment rate is negative and always significant at 1% level. The coefficients for the prime mortgage rate and long-term Treasury bill returns are negative and significant if they are included separately but non-significant or positive if they are both included in the model. This result suggests that these two interest rates are correlated. Further, the prime mortgage rate is likely a more important channel of influence over housing prices than long-term Treasury bill returns given that its coefficient is larger and always carries the expected sign. The coefficient for the loan to price ratio is negative but small and not always significant. The coefficient for the WRLURI index for regulation strength is positive and significant at 5% level, and the coefficient for the supply elasticity index according to Saiz (2010) is not significant. The coefficient for construction costs has the expected sign (negative) and significant but rather small.
When we conduct robustness checks on two additional specifications where the income, population, and unemployment variables are each lagged by 4 periods (one year), we find that the estimated coefficient for the recourse dummy is robust against the change in the lags of the control variables. In particular, the between R squared of the panel data regression increases when the macroeconomic variables are lagged, indicating that models with lagged macroeconomic variables indeed have greater descriptive power. These findings are summarized in Result 1:
We find evidence supporting all our hypotheses. The HPI growth/drop/recovery rate is higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states during the housing boom/bust/rebound period, and the difference is almost always significant.
Why is the difference between non-recourse and recourse states larger during the bust phase than during the boom phase? There are two possible explanations for this result: (1) The boom phase consists of a greater number of periods than the bust phase, and even though housing prices decrease by almost the same percentage during the bust phase as they increase during the boom phase, the rate at which the prices drop per period during the bust phase is higher than the rate at which they increase during the boom phase. In other words, the price change is more intensive during the bust phase than during the boom phase. The difference between non-recourse and recourse states is amplified by the same scale. (2) When borrowers default and their houses are auctioned by the court, they are typically sold at a particularly large discount relative to houses sold in other markets, exacerbating the depreciation of the average housing price during the bust phase.
Robustness Check
In this section, we estimate equation (1) without the time dummies for boom and bust.
This model addresses the potential concern for equation (1) on whether there is a difference between the HPI growth rate between recourse and non-recourse states over the entire period.
While the theoretical models predict a difference between the volatility of price between recourse and non-recourse states, the models do not predict a difference between the average price growths.
The results are reported in Table 5 . In general, the coefficient of the recourse dummy changes signs across different specifications, and is not significant even at 10% level. This result rules out the concern that the difference between recourse and non-recourse states in each of the boom, bust and rebound phases is caused by the difference in the overall trend of HPI.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Price Volatility
The standard deviation of housing prices is an indicator for the rate of fluctuation of housing prices. The results in section 3.2 suggest that non-recourse states experience a higher price change in each of the boom, bust and rebound periods, the price volatility is very likely to be higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states. We run a simple cross-sectional regression on the standard deviations of housing prices with the following specification:
The control variables include the standard deviation of population, income and unemployment in each period, the standard deviation of loan to price ratio, and the supply elasticity in each MSA. In addition to running this regression on the entire sample, we also estimate the equation separately for the boom, bust, and recovery phases by using the control variables for the same time window. Since controlling for construction cost will leave too few observations by reducing the number of observations from 100 to 46, we decide not to control it in this cross-section model. The national interest rate variables are not controlled for in this section because they are the same for all MSAs. If housing prices show greater variation in non-recourse states than in recourse states, the coefficient for recourse should always be negative. This proposition is formulated in Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4: 1 < 0. In non-recourse states, because borrowers have less liability, they may have a greater incentive to make speculative purchases, which introduces more uncertainty into the system. Therefore, the standard deviation of housing prices should be higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states.
The regression results are reported in Table 6 . When controlled for volatility of population, income and unemployment, the coefficient for recourse is significant at 1% level in boom and rebound period and significant at 10% level in bust period. Within the most elaborate model specification, where supply elasticity and LTP are controlled, the difference in the volatility of housing prices between non-recourse and recourse states is significant at the 1% in rebound period, yet not significant in other periods. The coefficients of recourse stay negative for all specification, which supports hypothesis 4. The volatility of housing prices is in general higher in states with a greater volatility in population, income rates, and unemployment rates. Supply elasticity can reduce the volatility of housing prices, while stricter regulation increases the volatility of housing prices. The volatility of housing prices is not significantly correlated with loan to price ratios and construction costs. These findings are summarized in Result 2:
Result 2: The evidence shows that housing prices are more volatile in non-recourse states than in recourse states over the entire period, although the coefficient is not significant after the supply elasticity is controlled for. The volatility of housing prices is significantly higher in non-recourse states than in recourse states during the rebound period.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of non-recourse mortgage policy on US housing price dynamics for the period from 2000 to 2013. Our analysis shows that after other factors affecting the fundamental value are controlled for, the change in housing prices is indeed greater in non-recourse states than in recourse states during the boom, bust, and rebound periods. Further, non-recourse mortgages are associated with higher market volatility, particularly during the rebound period. The implications of these findings are twofold: (1) non-recourse mortgages indeed appear to be a destabilizing factor in the housing market; (2) non-recourse mortgages may improve the resilience of the market, in that the price recovery is faster in these markets.
Based on the sharp difference between recourse and non-recourse states observed in our study, some policy implications can be drawn from our results with caution. In general, our findings suggest that authorities could adjust regulation regarding recourse vs. non-recourse mortgages according to the housing price cycle.
First, when the market has been in a long recession, as the situation in some European countries at the current stage, introducing non-recourse mortgages in a formerly recourse state or country may improve the price recovery.
Second, given the larger price volatility in the non-recourse states in the US, the policy maker may consider moving towards recourse when the market is not in a recession to avoid future price fluctuations. We understand that moving towards recourse may go against the ideology behind the liberal and "pro-debtor" bankruptcy rules since the bankruptcy law reform in 1978.
Meanwhile, Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) However, our results face the limitation that distinguishing recent recovery from new bubbles can be difficult. If the additional demand associated with non-recourse mortgages is primarily driven by speculation, the long-run cost of introducing non-recourse mortgages may be much greater than the short-run gain in price recovery and resilience. 
saiz:
Index of housing supply elasticity in US MSAs due to geographical reasons defined by Saiz (2010) .
wrluri:
The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index defined by Gyourko et al. (2008) , which describes how strictly the local land supply is regulated. A higher index is associated with stricter regulation and lower supply elasticity. Table 5 : Estimation Output for Equation (2) . The dependent variable is the percentage change of HPI, ℎ = 100 ( ). Names of the variables are explained in Table 1 .
Income, population and unemployment are also in terms of percentage change. Z-statistic based on robust standard error is reported between brackets. * are added to denote significance level: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1. 
